Minimal rights based solidarity by Luttens, Roland
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE 
EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
 
 
HOVENIERSBERG 24 
B-9000 GENT 
Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61 
Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
Minimal rights based solidarity 
 
Roland Iwan Luttens* 
 
 
 
 
January 2006 
 
2006/356 
 
 
 
                                                          
* Thanks to Dirk Van de gaer for stimulating discussions and suggestions and to Geert Dhaene, Marc Fleurbaey, 
François Maniquet, Glenn Rayp and Erik Schokkaert for insightful comments. Financial support from the Federal 
Public Planning Service Science Policy, Interuniversity Attraction Poles Program - Belgian Science Policy 
[Contract No. P5/21] is gratefully acknowledged. Address of correspondence: SHERPPA, Faculty of Economics 
and Business Administration, Ghent University, Hoveniersberg 24, 9000 Ghent, Belgium, tel: +32(0)92643487, 
fax: +32(0)92648996, Roland.Luttens@UGent.be. 
     D/2006/7012/01 
Minimal rights based solidarity
Roland Iwan Luttens∗
January 2006
Abstract
In a model where individuals with diﬀerent levels of skills exert diﬀerent
levels of eﬀort, we propose to use individuals’ minimal rights to divide an
extra amount of income generated by a change in the skill profile. Priority
is given to individuals with a positive minimal right. We characterize two
families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement
this solidarity idea. One family guarantees each individual her claim when
claims are feasible. The other family guarantees a non-negative income
after redistribution for all individuals.
JEL Classification: D63.
Keywords: minimal rights, solidarity, compensation, claims.
1 Motivation
Suppose income inequalities are determined by unequal exerted eﬀort levels and
diﬀerent innate skills. The goal of fair income redistribution is to guarantee
an equal income for individuals exerting the same eﬀort and to perform equal
income transfers to individuals with equal skills. However, in many contexts,
there does not exist a redistribution mechanism that simultaneously satisfies
both requirements. We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for an extensive
survey of this compensation problem. Weakening one of both requirements leads
to the proposition of diﬀerent (families of) redistribution mechanisms. Many
of these redistribution mechanisms rely on so called ‘reference’ income levels.
Typically, these reference income levels are computed by replacing either skill
levels or eﬀort levels by some reference value. Within one family of redistribution
mechanisms, diﬀerent mechanisms are distinguished by diﬀerent choices of the
reference value. The literature on fair income redistribution has some strong
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Dhaene, Marc Fleurbaey, Franc¸ois Maniquet, Glenn Rayp and Erik Schokkaert for insight-
ful comments. Financial support from the Federal Public Planning Service Science Policy,
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similarities with the literature on bankruptcy problems and surplus sharing
problems. This becomes clear when reference income levels are interpreted as
claims. In a bankruptcy problem, a fixed amount of money must be allocated
on the basis of monetary claims that sum up to more than can be divided. The
objective is to design allocation mechanisms that associate with each claims
problem a division of the amount available over the claimants. We refer to
Thomson (2003) for an extensive survey of the literature on competing claims
problems. In a surplus sharing problem, an amount of money that exceeds the
total sum of claims must be divided over all claimants. An extensive survey on
surplus sharing problems is Moulin (2002). Fair income redistribution problems
can be interpreted as competing claims (surplus sharing) problems where the
total sum of income before redistribution has to be divided over a population
of claimants that have reference incomes as claims.
In this paper we focus on two families of fair income redistribution mechanisms:
the family of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms due to Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) and Fleurbaey (1995) and the family of Proportionally Adjusted Equiv-
alent mechanisms due to Iturbe (1997). These families are characterized in
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) using diﬀerent strenghtenings of a compensation
axiom called ‘Solidarity’, in combination with a weak responsibility axiom called
‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’. The solidarity axioms describe solutions to
‘the solidarity problem’. The solidarity problem is a competing claims/surplus
sharing problem where a change in the skill profile generates an extra amount
(or a loss) of pre-tax income that has to be divided over (taken away from)
the population of claimants. Under an Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism these
extra resources are divided equally and hence diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort lev-
els are not taken into account. Under a Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent
mechanism diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort levels are taken into account by dividing
extra resources proportionally to claims. We propose to divide extra resources
on the basis of the information contained in individuals’ minimal rights. The
minimal right of an individual equals the amount that remains from the total
sum of pre-tax income when all other individuals receive their claim. Priority is
given to individuals with a higher claim, which is due to higher exerted eﬀort,
once the total sum of pre-tax income exceeds threshold levels where individu-
als’ minimal rights become positive. We characterize two families of Minimal
Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that implement this solidarity idea. One
family also satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’, while the other family
guarantees a non-negative income after redistribution for all individuals.
In the next section we present the model, state the compensation problem, de-
fine the diﬀerent families of fair income redistribution mechanisms, discuss their
characterizations and illustrate the income distributions that result from these
families. In section 3 we introduce the notion of minimal rights and propose to
use minimal rights to solve the solidarity problem. We state the solidarity ax-
ioms of ‘Symmetry’ and ‘Priority’ that together constitute the central solidarity
idea of this paper, Minimal Rights based Solidarity. We then characterize two
families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms. For a given reference
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skill, we show that the family that guarantees all individuals a non-negative
income redistributes income more equally than the family that satisfies ‘Equal
Transfer for Reference Skill’. This latter family is equivalent with the family of
Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms in rich economies where all minimal rights
are positive, but redistributes income more equally in poorer economies where
some or all minimal rights are zero. We show that the axioms used in the
characterizations are independent. Section 4 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Fair monetary compensation
2.1 The model
The fair monetary compensation model used in this paper is a one-dimensional
version of the quasi-linear model in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) which is due
to Bossert (1995). Denote N = {1, . . . , n} the finite population of size n ≥ 2.
Let x ∈ R be an amount of transferable resource. The characteristic which
elicits compensation, hereafter called ‘skill’, is y ∈ Y and Y is an interval of R.
Denote yN = (y1, . . . , yn) the skill profile in the population. The characteristic
which does not elicit compensation, hereafter called ‘eﬀort’, is z ∈ Z and Z is
an interval of R. Eﬀort is not influenced by redistribution as incentive issues
are not taken up in the model. Denote zN = (z1, . . . , zn) the eﬀort profile
in the population. Without loss of generality, we assume that individuals are
ranked such that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ≥ zn. An economy e = (yN , zN ) is the pair of
characteristics’ profiles. Denote E the set of economies.
We assume that utility functions are quasi-linear as follows:
ui(xi, yi) = xi + v(yi, zi).
In the context of this paper ui(xi, yi) measures a monetary outcome, namely
final income after redistribution. The function v : Y × Z → R++ : (yi, zi) →
v(yi, zi) describes the pre-tax income function. We assume that v is continuous
and strictly increasing in y and z. Furthermore, we assume that v is not ad-
ditively separable in y and z, i.e. v(yi, zi) cannot be written as v1(yi) + v2(zi).
Denote R =
P
i∈N v(yi, zi) the total sum of pre-tax income.
Let the transferable resource xi be an element of an allocation xN = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ Rn. We assume that the total amount to be distributed is 0, such that we
are looking at a pure redistribution problem. An allocation for the economy
e ∈ E is feasible when Pi∈N xi = 0. The set of feasible allocations is denoted
F . Notice that all feasible allocations are Pareto eﬃcient since we ruled out free
disposal in the definition of feasibility. The function S : E → F : e→ S(e) is an
allocation mechanism. Denote S the set of all allocation mechanisms.
Let y˜ ∈ Y be the reference skill. We assume throughout the paper that this
constant parameter is exogenously determined by the social planner. Denote
v(y˜, zi) the claim of individual i. It equals the pre-tax income that an individual
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would receive when exerting her eﬀort level zi but having skill y˜ instead of
her own skill yi. We bring all claims together in a vector ν and denote C =P
i∈N v(y˜, zi) the total sum of claims . Define the interval Ycc = {y˜ ∈ Y :
C ≥ R}. For parameter values of y˜ in Ycc, the total sum of claims is at least
as high as the total sum of pre-tax income (which can be redistributed) and a
competing claims problem arises. A competing claims problem is a pair (ν, R) ∈
Rn++ ×R++, such that C ≥ R. Define the interval Yss = {y˜ ∈ Y : C < R}. For
parameter values of y˜ in Yss, the total sum of claims is not as high as the total
sum of pre-tax income and a surplus sharing problem arises. A surplus sharing
problem is a pair (ν, R) ∈ Rn++ ×R++, such that C < R.
2.2 The compensation problem
We state the two key axioms that express the ethical goal of fair income re-
distribution, namely neutralizing income inequalities due to y while preserving
income inequalities due to z.
The first axiom states that when two individuals only diﬀer in skill levels, both
should receive the same income after redistribution. An allocation mechanism
S satisfies ‘Equal Income for Equal Eﬀort’ (EIEE, Fleurbaey (1994)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),∀i, j ∈ N,
zi = zj ⇒ xi + v(yi, zi) = xj + v(yj , zj).
Denote SEIEE the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy EIEE.
The second axiom states that when two individuals only diﬀer in exerted eﬀort
levels, they should be equally aﬀected by the performed redistribution. An
allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Equal Skill’ (ETES,
Fleurbaey (1994)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),∀i, j ∈ N,
yi = yj ⇒ xi = xj .
Denote SETES the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy ETES.
The compensation problem states that there does not exist an allocation mech-
anism that satisfies EIEE and ETES, i.e. SEIEE ∩ SETES = ∅. We refer to
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for a proof.
2.3 Allocation mechanisms
Weakening ETES or EIEE leads to the proposal of a number of interesting al-
location mechanisms. Two mechanisms that belong to SEIEE (and thus weaken
ETES) play an important role in this paper. We define them here. It concerns
a) the family of Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms due to Pazner and Schmei-
dler (1978) and Fleurbaey (1995) and b) the family of Proportionally Adjusted
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Equivalent mechanisms due to Iturbe (1997). Denote (xi)S the income transfer
for an individual i from an allocation (xN )S ∈ S(e) of an allocation mechanism
S.
a) An y˜-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜EE) allocates resources as follows:
∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ N,
(xi)Sy˜EE = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) + 1n(R− C).
b) An y˜-Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanism (Sy˜PAE) allocates re-
sources as follows:
∀e ∈ E,∀i ∈ N,
(xi)Sy˜PAE = −v(yi, zi) + RC v(y˜, zi).
2.4 The characterizations of Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
2.4.1 ETRS
The axiom of ETES is weakened to only apply to economies where all skills are
equal to the reference skill. In these economies no redistribution is performed.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Equal Transfer for Reference Skill’
(ETRS, Fleurbaey (1995)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),
[yi = y˜ ∀i ∈ N ]⇒ [xi = 0 ∀i ∈ N ].
Denote SETRS the set of all allocation mechanisms that satisfy ETRS. It is
easy to check that Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE belong to SETRS.
2.4.2 Solidarity axioms
Solidarity axioms consider the eﬀect of a change in one individual’s skill on
the allocation. Consider two skill profiles yN = (y1, . . . , yk, . . . , yn) and y
0
N =
(y01, . . . , y0k, . . . , y
0
n), where, for all j in N\{k}, yj equals y0j . Let e0 = (y0N , zN )
and R0 =
P
i∈N v(y
0
i, zi). Denote the change in total pre-tax income ∆R =
R0 − R. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that e0
yields more pre-tax income than e and hence∆R ∈ R++. The solidarity problem
is how ∆R should be divided over the population. Note that, as y˜ is constant,
a change in the skill profile does not alter individuals’ claims, i.e. ν equals ν0.
The axiom of EIEE is strengthened to an axiom that says that a change in the
skill profile should aﬀect all agents’ final incomes in the same direction.1 An
allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Solidarity’ (Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004))
if:
1We refer to Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) for a proof.
5
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),
[x0i + v(y
0
i, zi) ≥ xi + v(yi, zi) ∀i ∈ N ].
The axiom of Solidarity is easily defensible. As diﬀerences in the skill profile
elicit compensation, it is clear that changes in the skill profile should not make
some individuals gain income while others lose income.
2.4.3 Sy˜EE
Solidarity can be strengthened by stating that all incomes should change equally
due to a change in the skill profile. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Additive
Solidarity’ (AS, Bossert (1995)) if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),£
x0i + v(y
0
i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x0j + v(y0j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)) ∀i, j ∈ N
¤
.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS and AS if and only if it is an Sy˜EE.
We refer to Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) for a proof.
When an Sy˜EE is implemented and the skill profile changes, ∆R is divided
equally over all individuals. However, eﬀort also determines ∆R. Therefore,
Sy˜EE can be criticized for not taking diﬀerences in exerted eﬀort into account
when dividing ∆R.
2.4.4 Sy˜PAE
Alternatively, Solidarity can be strengthened by requiring that all individuals’
outcomes change proportionally. An allocation mechanism S satisfies ‘Multiplicative
Solidarity’ (MS, Iturbe (1997)) if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),£
(x0i + v(y
0
i, zi))(xj + v(yj , zj)) = (xi + v(yi, zi))(x
0
j + v(y
0
j , zj)) ∀i, j ∈ N
¤
.
An allocation mechanism S satisfies ETRS andMS if and only if it is an Sy˜PAE.
We refer to Iturbe (1997) for a proof.
When an Sy˜PAE is implemented and the skill profile changes, diﬀerences in eﬀort
are taken into account by dividing ∆R proportionally to individuals’ claims.
Indeed, the ratio of changes in individuals’ incomes equals the ratio of their
respective claims, i.e.
x0i+v(y
0
i,zi)−(xi+v(yi,zi))
x0j+v(y
0
j ,zj)−(xj+v(yj ,zj))
= v(y˜,zi)v(y˜,zj) for all i, j in N .
2
In this paper we propose to reward eﬀort in a diﬀerent way by giving, in the
division of ∆R, priority to the highest claims once the total sum of pre-tax
income exceeds a particular threshold level to be explained in section 3.
2We suppose that the denominator at the left hand side is diﬀerent from zero. As suchMS
is a strengthening of a strict version of Solidarity with a strict inequality sign in the definition.
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2.5 Income distributions under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
Figure 1 illustrates for every value of R the income distributions under an Sy˜EE
and an Sy˜PAE for an economy with four individuals whose claims are in a ratio of
6:4:2:1. As both redistribution mechanisms satisfy the axiom of ETRS, income
is redistributed such that every individual receives her claim when R equals C.
As a consequence of their respective solidarity axioms, when R changes, the
absolute income inequality remains constant under Sy˜EE (full line), while the
relative income inequality remains constant under Sy˜PAE (dotted line).
-
6
0 C R
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v(y˜, z3)
v(y˜, z2)
v(y˜, z1)
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Figure 1: Income distributions under Sy˜EE and Sy˜PAE
3 Minimal rights based solidarity
3.1 Minimal rights
Rather than to base the division of ∆R on individuals’ claims, we propose to
use individuals’ minimal rights, a concept often used in the competing claims
literature originating from seminal contributions of O’Neill (1982) and Aumann
and Maschler (1985).3
The minimal right of an individual equals the amount that remains from the
total sum of pre-tax income when all other claimants have received their claim.
However, the minimal right is not allowed to be negative or to exceed the indi-
vidual’s own claim. Formally, we define the minimal right of an individual i as
follows:
3Minimal rights should not be confused with the concept of equal rights introduced in
Maniquet (1998). In a model with production, an allocation mechanism guarantees an equal
right when every individual weakly prefers her bundle over her best choice from a common
opportunity set.
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mi (ν, R) = min (v(y˜, zi),max (R− C−i, 0)),
where
C−i =
P
j∈N\{i} v(y˜, zj) for all i in N .
Figure 2 shows that as long as R is smaller than C−1, all minimal rights are
zero. As soon as R exceeds C−1, the minimal right of the individual with eﬀort
level z1 becomes positive. As soon as R exceeds C−2, the minimal right of
the individual with eﬀort level z1 exceeds C−2 − C−1 and the minimal right
of the individual with eﬀort level z2 becomes positive. As R increases, more
and more individuals start to get a positive minimal right and as soon as R
exceeds C−n all minimal rights are positive. When R equals C (and thus claims
are feasible) every individual has a minimal right equal to her claim. When
R exceeds C minimal rights do not change anymore, so in all surplus sharing
problems mi (ν, R) equals v(y˜, zi) for all i in N .
-
0 C−1 C−2 C−n C R
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Figure 2: Aggregate resources, minimal rights and claims
Minimal rights could be given a ‘democratic’ interpretation. For a given y˜,
suppose that R equals C−2. Then all individuals in society agree that the
individual with eﬀort level z1 deserves at least her minimal right, i.e. C−2−C−1,
of R. Suppose that R equals C−3. Then there is agreement that the amount
C−2−C−1 should only go to the individual with eﬀort level z1, while the amount
C−3 − C−2 should be divided only over the individual with eﬀort level z1 and
the individual with eﬀort level z2. Since both individuals deserve the amount
C−3 − C−2, it seems natural to divide the amount C−3 − C−2 equally between
both individuals.
3.2 Solidarity axioms
We exploit these ideas in the statement of our solidarity axioms. When the skill
profile changes, it is clear that none, some or all minimal rights may change.
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Denote ∆mi (ν, R,∆R) = mi (ν, R+∆R)−mi (ν, R) the change in the minimal
right of individual i due to a change of total pre-tax income equal to ∆R.
These changes in minimal rights could be informative for the division of ∆R.
Suppose that R and R0 are smaller than C−1. Since all minimal rights are zero
before and after the change in the skill profile, it seems reasonable to divide
∆R equally over all individuals. Suppose now that R0 further increases to C−2.
Then priority could be given to the individual with eﬀort level z1 who receives
C−2 − C−1 –an amount equal to the change in her minimal right– while the
rest, C−1 − R, is divided equally over all individuals. Suppose now that R0
further increases to C−3. Then the amount C−1 − R could be divided equally
over all individuals, because nobody has a positive minimal right up to income
level C−1. Then priority could be given to the individual with eﬀort level z1
who additionally receives C−2−C−1 because there is no other individual with a
positive minimal right from income level C−1 up to income level C−2. Finally,
the amount C−3 − C−2 could be divided equally between the individual with
eﬀort level z1 and the individual with eﬀort level z2 because they are the only
individuals with a positive minimal right from income level C−2 up to income
level C−3. This iterative process can be continued as R
0 increases until R0
exceeds C−n. As all individuals have a positive minimal right after the income
level C−n and their minimal rights change equally between C−n and R
0, it seems
reasonable to divide R0 −C−n again equally over all individuals. The following
axioms express these ideas.
The first axiom weakens Additive Solidarity by requiring an equal treatment in
the allocation of ∆R only when minimal rights change equally. A redistribution
mechanism S satisfies ‘Symmetry’ if:4
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),∀i, j ∈ N,
∆mi (ν, R,∆R) = ∆mj (ν, R,∆R)
⇒ x0i + v(y0i, zi)− (xi + v(yi, zi)) = x0j + v(y0j , zj)− (xj + v(yj , zj)).
The second axiom is inspired by the idea that individuals whose minimal rights
change should be given priority over individuals whose minimal rights do not
change in the allocation of ∆R once not all minimal rights are equal to zero.
Denote N1 = {i ∈ N |∆mi (ν, R,∆R) > 0} the set of individuals whose minimal
rights change due to a change of R. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies
‘Priority’ if:
∀e, e0 ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e), x0N ∈ S(e0),
if there exists i ∈ N1, ∆mi (ν, R,∆R) = ∆R :P
i∈N1 (x
0
i + v(y
0
i, zi)− xi − v(yi, zi)) = ∆R.
4Note that, as minimal rights do not change anymore in surplus sharing problems, ETRS
and Symmetry characterize the y˜-Egalitarian Equivalent mechanism for y˜ ∈ Yss (see 2.4.3).
In the surplus sharing literature, this mechanism is better known as the Equal Surplus Sharing
mechanism: every claimant receives her claim plus an equal share of the surplus.
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Symmetry and Priority together express the paper’s central solidarity idea of
Minimal Rights based Solidarity, i.e. it explains how ∆R should be divided over
the population. When all minimal rights change equally, Symmetry implies
that ∆R is divided equally. As the pre-tax income function v is continuous and
strictly increasing in y, there exist unique intermediary skill levels such that,
when changes in minimal rights diﬀer, ∆R can be divided in specific subchanges.
For each of these subchanges of ∆R, the population is partitioned in two groups:
(i) a group whose change in minimal rights equals the subchange of ∆R and
(ii) a group whose minimal rights do not change. Symmetry implies that within
each group all individuals are treated in the same way, whereas Priority requires
that the first group receives the subchange of ∆R. Hence, the subchange of ∆R
is equally divided among the individuals of the first group. We state Minimal
Rights based Solidarity formally in appendix.
3.3 Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms
In the previous subsection Minimal Rights based Solidarity described how to di-
vide ∆R. We call fair income redistribution mechanisms that satisfy Symmetry
and Priority Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms. In order to charac-
terize one particular family of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms,
it suﬃces to combine the solidarity axioms of Symmetry and Priority with an
axiom that for one specific R implies one specific income distribution.
3.3.1 Sy˜MRE/E
The axiom of ETRS states that when R equals C every individual should
receive her claim. Combining Symmetry, Priority and ETRS characterizes the
following mechanism.
An y˜-Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism Sy˜MRE/E allocates resources
as follows:
∀e ∈ E,
(1) when C−n ≤ R :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) + R−Cn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yi, zi)+v(y˜, zi)+
C−n−C
n −
n−1P
h=k+1
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+
R−C−(k+1)
k
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(xj)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yj , zj) + v(y˜, zj) +
C−n−C
n −
n−1P
h=j
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− 1} and
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(xn)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yn, zn) + v(y˜, zn) +
C−n−C
n ,
(3) when R < C−1 :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yi, zi) + v(y˜, zi) +
C−n−C
n −
n−1P
h=i
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+ R−C−1n
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
(xn)Sy˜MRE/E = −v(yn, zn) + v(y˜, zn) +
C−n−C
n +
R−C−1
n .
Proposition 1 : ∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/E ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority
and ETRS.
The proof of proposition 1 can be found in appendix.
Figure 3 depicts for every value of R the income distributions under an Sy˜MRE/E
for the same economy as in figure 1.
-
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Figure 3: Income distributions under Sy˜MRE/E
As Sy˜MRE/E also satisfies ETRS, income is redistributed such that every indi-
vidual receives her claim when R equals C. When, due to a change in the skill
profile, R becomes higher than C, every individual receives her claim plus an
equal part of R− C. When R becomes lower than C, every individual receives
an income that is lower than her claim, but the shortfall from the claim is never
lower for individuals with a higher claim. As long as R is higher than C−4,
the loss of total pre-tax income is equally borne by all individuals. But, when
R falls below C−4, the income of the poorest individual is left constant, which
brings about an extra loss of income for all other individuals. When R becomes
smaller than C−3, the incomes of the poorest and second poorest individuals
remain constant and, when R falls below C−2, the richest individual alone is
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saddled with the entire cost of keeping the incomes of all other individuals con-
stant. When R becomes smaller than C−1, the loss of total pre-tax income is
again borne equally by all individuals.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from comparing figures 1 and 3. We
say that, in the comparison of two income distributions A and B with the same
mean, A is more equal than B when A is obtained from B by performing a
series of (Pigou-Dalton) rich-to-poor transfers that do not entail rank reversals.
- In economies where every individual has a strictly positive minimal right
(C−n < R), an Sy˜MRE/E redistributes income just like an Sy˜EE. Both mecha-
nisms redistribute income more equally than an Sy˜PAE as soon as R is larger
than C.
- In economies where some but not all minimal rights are strictly positive (C−1 <
R ≤ C−n), the income distribution under an Sy˜MRE/E is more equal than the
income distribution under an Sy˜EE.
- In economies where all minimal rights are zero (R ≤ C−1), absolute income
inequalities remain constant under an Sy˜MRE/E and under an Sy˜EE when R
changes, but incomes are more equally distributed under the former mechanism.
Note that the incomes of the individuals with the highest and second highest
eﬀort level coincide under an Sy˜MRE/E in these economies.
3.3.2 Sy˜MRE/P
Figures 1 and 3 show a debatable property of Sy˜EE and Sy˜MRE/E: the poorest
individuals might end up with a negative income after redistribution in poor
societies (i.e. when R is suﬃciently low). Our ethical intuition may lead us to
consider a minimal amount of redistribution that we at least want to perform.
Suppose that the poorest in society could not satisfy their basic needs when they
receive a negative income after redistribution. Society wants to exclude this pos-
sibility in every situation by incorporating the requirement of a non-negative
income after redistribution for all individuals in the construction of the redis-
tribution mechanism. A redistribution mechanism S satisfies ‘Participation’
(Maniquet (1998)) if:
∀e ∈ E, xN ∈ S(e),
xi + v(yi, zi) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N .
An implication of Participation is that, when R converges to zero, all incomes
should also converge to zero. Combining Participation with the solidarity ax-
ioms of Symmetry and Priority characterizes the following mechanism.
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An y˜-Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanism Sy˜MRE/P allocates resources
as follows:
∀e ∈ E,
(1) when R < C−1 :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yi, zi) + Rn for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yi, zi) +
C−1
n +
kP
h=i
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+
R−C−(k+1)
k
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
(xj)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yj , zj) +
C−1
n for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when C−n ≤ R :
(xi)Sy˜MRE/P = −v(yi, zi) +
C−1
n +
n−1P
h=i
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+ R−C−nn
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
(xn)Sy˜MRE = −v(yn, zn) +
C−1
n +
R−C−n
n .
Proposition 2 : ∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/P ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and
Participation.
The proof of proposition 2 can be found in appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates, for the same economy as in figures 1 and 3, the income
distributions under Sy˜MRE/P .
-
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Figure 4: Income distributions under Sy˜MRE/P
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An Sy˜MRE/P redistributes incomes very equally. It is easy to check that, for
every value of R, the income distribution under Sy˜MRE/P is more equal than the
income distribution under Sy˜MRE/E . An equal distribution of income prevails
as long as all minimal rights are zero. More generally, when R is lower than or
equal to C−i for some i in N , all individuals with z lower than or equal to zi
receive the same income. However, one could argue that too much redistribution
is performed. Figure 4 shows that when all individuals have y equal to y˜ and
hence only diﬀer with respect to their responsibility characteristic z (such that
no redistribution is needed), Pigou-Dalton transfers are still performed. As
Sy˜MRE/E and Sy˜MRE/P are diﬀerent mechanisms, Participation is incompatible
with ETRS when Symmetry and Priority are imposed.
3.3.3 Discussion
We end this section by discussing that the incompatibility between Participation
and ETRS when Symmetry and Priority are imposed, is due to Symmetry
rather than Priority. We also show that the axioms used in propositions 1 and
2 are independent.
When Priority is dropped, imposing Participation, Symmetry and ETRS still
leads to an incompatibility, except when the lowest n − 1 responsibility char-
acteristics are equal. This is most easily explained as follows. Start from an
income distribution (0, 0, . . . , 0) when R converges to zero (Participation). Now
suppose R0 equals C. Then ETRS requires that every individual receives her
claim. Hence, the individual with eﬀort level zn should in that case receive
v(y˜, zn). Symmetry requires that the subchanges of ∆R for which all minimal
rights change equally, i.e. C−1 and C − C−n (= v(y˜, zn)), are divided equally
over the entire population. Given our assumptions about the pre-tax income
function v, the condition 1nC−1 +
1
nv(y˜, zn) = v(y˜, zn) can only hold when
z2 = z3 = . . . = zn. Note the ineﬀectiveness of restricting the range of choices
of y˜ the social planner can make, as the incompatibility between Symmetry,
Participation and ETRS holds for every value of y˜.
When Symmetry is dropped, Participation, Priority and ETRS are compatible
but do not characterize a unique redistribution mechanism. Figure 5 illustrates
two diﬀerent mechanisms that satisfy Participation, Priority and ETRS. When
R falls below C both mechanisms first reduce the income of the poorest indi-
vidual to zero. But, as soon as R falls below C−1, the first mechanism (full
line) in turn reduces the income of the second poorest, second richest and rich-
est individual respectively to zero, whereas the second mechanism (dotted line)
first equalizes the incomes of the three individuals and afterwards reduces their
incomes by equal amounts.
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Figure 5: Two diﬀerent mechanisms satisfying Participation, Priority and ETRS
The axioms used in the characterization of Sy˜MRE/E are independent. For
example, Sy˜EE satisfies ETRS and Symmetry but violates Priority. The two
mechanisms of figure 5 satisfyETRS and Priority but violate Symmetry. Sy˜MRE/P
satisfies Symmetry and Priority but violates ETRS. The axioms used in the
characterization of Sy˜MRE/P are also independent. A straightforward example
of a mechanism that satisfies Participation and Symmetry but violates Prior-
ity is the equal division of income. The two mechanisms of figure 5 satisfy
Participation and Priority but violate Symmetry. Finally, Sy˜MRE/E satisfies
Symmetry and Priority but violates Participation.
4 Conclusion
The choice of a particular mechanism to divide the sum of total pre-tax income
over a population of claimants inextricably brings about a particular way to
solve the solidarity problem. We propose to use the information of individuals’
minimal rights to divide an extra amount of income generated by a change
in the skill profile. The idea is to give priority to individuals with a positive
minimal right. We present Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms that
implement this solidarity idea. We contrast Egalitarian Equivalent mechanisms
(Sy˜EE) and Proportionally Adjusted Equivalent mechanisms (Sy˜PAE), two well
known families of fair redistribution mechanisms presented in the literature,
with two families of Minimal Rights based Egalitarian mechanisms (Sy˜MRE/E
and Sy˜MRE/P ). The following table summarizes our axiomatic analysis into the
properties of these mechanisms.
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Sy˜EE Sy˜PAE Sy˜MRE/E Sy˜MRE/P
EIEE + + + +
ETES − − − −
ETRS F F F −
Solidarity + + + +
AS F − − −
MS − F − −
Symmetry + − F F
Priority − − F F
Participation − + − F
F: used in characterization of S
+: S satisfies the axiom (but not used in characterization)
−: S violates the axiom
The study into the income inequalities resulting from these mechanisms learns
that, given y˜, an Sy˜MRE/P always redistributes income more equally than an
Sy˜MRE/E . The latter mechanism redistributes income more equally than an
Sy˜EE when none or some (but not all) minimal rights are positive. When
all minimal rights are positive Sy˜EE and Sy˜MRE/E are equivalent. All three
mechanisms redistribute income more equally than an Sy˜PAE in surplus sharing
problems.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 states formally the solidarity idea of Minimal Rights based Solidar-
ity, i.e. how a change in the total sum of pre-tax income is divided over the
population such that the axioms of Symmetry and Priority are satisfied.
Lemma 1 (Minimal Rights based Solidarity): Consider ∆R > 0 due to a
skill change from yi to y
0
i of an individual i in N . Denote di = x
0
i + v(y
0
i, zi) −
(xi + v(yi, zi));
P
i∈N di = ∆R. One of five possible situations occurs:
(1) when R0 ≤ C−1 or C−n ≤ R :
di =
∆R
n for all i in N ,
(2) when, for k ≤ n− 1, C−k ≤ R < R0 < C−(k+1) :
di =
∆R
k for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
dj = 0 for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
(3) when, for k ≤ n − 1, C−k ≤ R < C−(k+1) and, for 2 ≤ l ≤ n, C−l ≤ R0 <
C−(l+1)
5 and k < l :
di =
C−(k+1)−R
k +
l−1P
h=k+1
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+ R
0−C−l
l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
5When l = n, define C−(l+1) = +∞.
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dj =
l−1P
h=j
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+ R
0−C−l
l for all j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , l − 1} and
dl =
R0−C−l
l and
dq = 0 for all q ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
(4) when R ≤ C−1 and, for l ≤ n− 1, C−l ≤ R0 < C−(l+1) :
di =
C−1−R
n +
lP
h=i
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+
R0−C−(l+1)
l for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and
dj =
C−1−R
n for all j ∈ {l + 1, . . . , n},
(5) when R ≤ C−1 and C−n ≤ R0 :
di =
C−1−R
n +
n−1P
h=i
³
C−(h+1)−C−h
h
´
+ R
0−C−n
n for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and
dn =
C−1−R
n +
R0−C−n
n .
Proof. Suppose the antecedent of (1) is true. None of the minimal rights
change and the division of∆R is obtained by Symmetry. Suppose the antecedent
of (2) is true. There are two groups of individuals. For individuals 1 to k minimal
rights change equally. For individuals k+ 1 to n minimal rights do not change.
Symmetry implies that, within each group, all individuals are treated in the
same way. Priority requires that the first group receives ∆R. The division of
∆R then follows straightforwardly. Suppose the antecedent of (3) is true. As
v is continuous and strictly increasing in y, there exist for individual i unique
intermediary skill levels yˆki , yˆ
k+1
i , . . . , yˆ
l
i such that, ceteris paribus, the total sum
of pre-tax income equals C−k, C−(k+1), . . . , C−l respectively. Now consider skill
changes from yi to yˆ
k
i , yˆ
k
i to yˆ
k+1
i ,. . . , yˆ
l
i to y
0
i such that the total change of
pre-tax income equals C−k −R,C−(k+1) −C−k, . . . , R0 −C−l respectively. For
each of these subchanges there are two groups of individuals: (i) a group whose
change in minimal rights is equal to the subchange and (ii) a group whose
minimal rights do not change. Symmetry implies that within each group all
individuals are treated in the same way, whereas Priority requires that the first
group receives the subchange. Hence, the subchange is equally divided among
the individuals of the first group. The division of ∆R is obtained from applying
Symmetry and Priority to the division of these subchanges. The division of ∆R
under (4) and (5) is obtained by similar reasoning as in (3). ¥
Proof of proposition 1
∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/E ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and ETRS.
Proof. We only proof (⇐). Define an economy e˜ = ((y˜, . . . , y˜), (z1, . . . , zn)).
By ETRS, x˜i = 0 for all i in N and individuals’ final incomes are equal to their
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claims. Call this the ‘initial income distribution’. Rather than successively con-
sidering n changes from y˜ to yi for every i in N and using Lemma 1 successively
to divide the intermediate subchanges in total pre-tax income (a process where
in many cases previous subchanges in total pre-tax income would cancel out),
we immediately use Lemma 1 to divide ∆R = C − R.6 The transfers of (1) in
the definition of Sy˜MRE/E then follow from adding to the initial income distri-
bution the transfers described in case (1) in lemma 1. The transfers of (2) then
follow from subtracting of the initial income distribution the transfers described
in case (3) with l = n in lemma 1. The transfers of (3) then follow from sub-
tracting of the initial income distribution the transfers described in case (5) in
lemma 1. ¥
Proof of proposition 2
∀e ∈ E : S = Sy˜MRE/P ⇔ S satisfies Symmetry, Priority and Participation.
Proof. We only proof (⇐). Participation requires that, when R converges
to zero, all incomes also converge to zero. Let (0, 0, . . . , 0) be the initial income
distribution. Now, use Lemma 1 to divide ∆R = R − 0. The transfers of (1)
in the definition of Sy˜MRE/P are then described in case (1) in lemma 1. The
transfers of (2) are then described in case (4) in lemma 1. The transfers of (3)
are then described in case (5) in lemma 1. ¥
References
[1] Aumann, R. and Maschler, M. (1985), Game theoretic analysis of a
bankruptcy problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic Theory 36,
195-213.
[2] Bossert, W. (1995), Redistribution mechanisms based on individual factors,
Mathematical Social Sciences 29, 1-17.
[3] Bossert, W. and Fleurbaey, M. (1996), Redistribution and compensation,
Social Choice and Welfare 13, 343-355.
[4] Fleurbaey, M. (1994), On fair compensation, Theory and Decision 36, 277-
307.
[5] Fleurbaey, M. (1995), Three solutions for the compensation problem, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 65, 505-521.
[6] Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F. (2004), Compensation and responsibil-
ity, mimeo, forthcoming in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.),
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, North-Holland: Else-
vier.
6In cases (2) and (3) (and possibly also (1)) in the definition of an y˜-Minimal Rights based
Egalitarian mechanism, R < C.
18
[7] Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I. (1997), Redistribution and individual characteristics,
Review of Economic Design 3, 45-55.
[8] Maniquet, F. (1998) An equal right solution to the compensation-
responsibility dilemma, Mathematical Social Sciences 35(2), 185-202.
[9] Moulin, H. (2002), Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing, in K.J. Arrow,
A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
Volume 1, North-Holland: Elsevier.
[10] O’Neill, B. (1982), A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud, Math-
ematical Social Sciences 2, 345-371.
[11] Pazner, E. and Schmeidler, D. (1978), Egalitarian equivalent allocations:
A new concept of economic equity, Quarterly Journal of Economics 92,
671-687.
[12] Thomson, W. (2003), Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy
and taxation problems: a survey,Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249-297.
19
